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The Transformation Test:
Artistic Expression, Fair Use, and the Derivative Right
*

Frank Houston

“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [art]
. . . .”1
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
The fair use doctrine is perhaps copyright law’s most malleable
concept. Defined as a privilege allowing the use of copyrighted material, for limited purposes, without the copyright owner’s consent,2
fair use stands for the proposition that copyright protection is not absolute. Copyright law’s purpose is twofold: It protects the remunerative interests of authors, and it cultivates a culture of learning and
creativity.3 If its protections are too narrow, copyright’s incentives
may be inadequate to motivate authors to create; if they are extended
too broadly, copyright owners might chill discourse and cultural development.4 Fair use straddles this divide. The doctrine is a recognition that society is served by a free flow of ideas; copyright should not
dam the river at its source, depriving those who seek to drink from its
waters downstream. Fair use requires courts to apply copyright law

*
Frank Houston is a 2011 graduate of the Florida International University College of
Law and the former Editor-in-Chief of FIU Law Review. He has a Master of Science in Journalism from Columbia University and Bachelor of Arts in English from Emory University. Frank
would like to express gratitude to the following scholars for their feedback on this Comment:
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Harvard Law School; Anthony Falzone, the Executive Director of
the Fair Use Project and a Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School; and Professor Rebecca
Tushnet at the Georgetown University Law Center.
1
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
2
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H.
BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
3
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990).
4
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
285 (1996).
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with flexibility when it threatens to squelch the very creativity it is
5
supposed to nurture.
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that
allows the reproduction, without permission, of copyrighted material
for such purposes as commentary, criticism, and news-gathering.
Though it had been part of the common law of copyright for centuries, the doctrine was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.6 The objective is to carve out certain “fair uses” that allow a secondary author
to incorporate copyrighted elements of an original work — whether an
excerpt or something new that derives from that original — that are
technically infringing, but statutorily defensible. In deciding whether
such uses are “fair,” judges consider four statutory factors that look,
essentially, to the nature of the borrowing and its economic impact on
7
the author of the original. In applying the four factors, judges wield a
8
tremendous amount of discretion.
A particularly difficult issue in fair use determinations is the concept of “transformation,” the question to what extent a secondary
work may draw on a copyrighted original because it goes on to “transform” that original into something new.9 On the one hand, transformation lies at the heart of creative expression; on the other, it clashes
with one of modern copyright law’s most expansive provisions: the
copyright holder’s right to control derivative works. As a result,
courts sometimes struggle to distinguish between a fair use and a de10
rivative one. “The source of confusion is a distinction the law no
longer cares to draw . . . between republishing someone else’s work
[and] building upon or transforming that work.”11
This Comment will explore the fair use doctrine, focusing specifically on the evolution of transformative fair use as it has been defined
and interpreted in several key decisions related to artistic expression.
In Part I, I sketch a brief history of copyright law, leading up to the
1976 codification of both the fair use doctrine and the derivative right,
two concepts that are frequently at odds. I explore the challenges
faced by judges charged with interpreting the statute, as well as those
5
Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
6
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006)).
7
17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008).
8
See Leval, supra note 3, at 1126.
9
Id. at 1111.
10 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 19 (2004).
11 Id.
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faced by secondary authors confronted with an expanding bundle of
rights held by copyright holders.
Part II investigates the major court decisions, from the district
court level to the Supreme Court, that have defined and interpreted
transformative fair use in the context of artistic expression. I place
12
special emphasis on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, in which the Supreme Court first recognized and defined the scope of transformative
use, and SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,13 a recent and potentially influential decision in which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated an injunction against the publisher of The Wind
Done Gone,14 a parody of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind.
While inarguably derivative, The Wind Done Gone was found to have
sufficiently transformed the original — as both parody and critique — to
be a fair use of its key characters and concepts, and not merely a se15
quel. Importantly, in reaching its decision, the court also held that
the First Amendment militated against injunctive relief, a first in fair
use jurisprudence. Because the Supreme Court has yet to define the
contours of transformative fair use in a purely literary context, SunTrust Bank has the potential to have a great impact on future fair use
decisions.
The decision has already been brought to bear in Salinger v. Colting,16 where the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York17 drew a line such a transformative use must transcend to be a
valid fair use. The suit centers on Sixty Years Later: Coming Through
the Rye, an unauthorized sequel to J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye
written by Frederik Colting; the district court enjoined the publication
18
of Colting’s book last year. Simply put, the book just isn’t transformative enough. Taken together, the two lower court cases suggest an
emerging approach: In the case of Wind, the court deemed the exercise artistically worthwhile (although despite the lifting of the injunction, the case was still remanded to the district court to assess economic harm and potential damages).19 In the case of Salinger, the
court has read Rye-redux and found it wanting. (During oral argu12

510 U.S. 569 (1994).
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
14 Id. at 1277.
15 Id. at 1271.
16 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
17 This marks the second time the Court has ruled in favor of Salinger in a copyright infringement claim. In Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), the reclusive
author was granted an injunction against publication of a biography that quoted from his personal letters.
18 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
19 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
13
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ments, the court of appeals suggested it may agree with the lower
20
court’s literary, if not legal, critique. Ultimately the court remanded
21
the case, but did not disturb the lower court’s fair use finding.) The
Salinger and SunTrust cases find courts navigating a course somewhere between judicial interpretation and outright literary criticism in
an attempt to define transformative fair use in a derivative literary
context.22
Part III of the Comment considers a variety of prescriptions for
overhauling — or, at the very least, refining — the fair use doctrine.
These include narrowing or at least reinterpreting the derivative right,
and curbing the use of preliminary injunctions in the interest of protecting expression.
In Part IV, I urge the adoption of a doctrine of transformation. I
begin with an attempt to stitch together a workable definition of
transformation from the case law. From there I propose a compulsory
statutory license as a means of easing and systematizing the implementation of transformative uses by mandating a fee for original creators, and I proceed to emphasize the important role a transformation
doctrine can play in restoring balance to the First Amendment — legal
monopoly continuum on which copyright law exists. The Comment
concludes with an exhortation of the importance of fair use reform in
view of the seismic changes occurring as digital technologies transform artistic expression.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND FAIR USE
The origins of modern copyright law stretch back 300 years, to
the English Statute of Anne, passed by Parliament in 1710.23 The law
created a statutory right in authors limited to fourteen years and re24
newable for an additional fourteen years. In the United States, copyright statutes among the newly independent states were modeled on
the British statute until the Constitution explicitly vested power in the

20 “One of the judges, Guido Calabresi, elicited loud laughter from the gallery when he
offered as an aside that 60 Years Later . . . ‘is a rather dismal piece of work if I may say so.’” Ed
Shanahan, Second Circuit Judge: Catcher-based Book “Rather Dismal Piece of Work”, THE AM
LAW DAILY, Sept. 3, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/09/ salingerappeal.html.
21 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.
22 Salinger, 607 F.3d 68; SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1260.
23 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, C.19 (1710), reprinted in 8 MELVILLE
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7-5 (1990).
24 The 1790 Act allowed renewal of a copyright for a second fourteen-year term if the
author was alive at the expiration of the first fourteen-year term. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch.
15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
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federal government to create patents and copyrights. Congress
25
passed the first Copyright Act in 1790.
As recently as 1991, the Supreme Court clarified that “the sine
qua non of copyright is originality. . . . Original, as the term is used in
copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”26 The writings worthy of
protection, the Court said, are those that “are the fruits of intellectual
27
labor.” Copyright “assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”28
The original 1790 legislation granted authors protection for
books, maps, and charts for fourteen years and allowed copyright renewal for a second fourteen-year term.29 There copyright law stood,
for more than a century. Subsequent revisions in 1909, 1976, and 1998
30
significantly expanded copyright’s domain. Copyrightable subject
matter grew to encompass music and dance, visual arts like painting
and photography, movies, and computer programs. To qualify for
protection, a work need only exhibit a “modicum of creativity”31 and
be fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.”32 The duration of copyright has grown to encompass the lifetime of the author plus seventy
years. And most importantly, the bundle of rights associated with
copyright protection now stretches well beyond mere copying, enfolding rights of distribution, performance and display, and derivative
works based on the original but in different forms or otherwise altered.
As the rights conferred by copyright have expanded, they have
increasingly come into conflict with the Constitution’s overarching
philosophy toward intellectual property, which is that copyright exists
primarily in order not to reward authorship, but rather to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”33 While acknowledging that
copyright bestows a kind of monopoly on authors, in 1984 Justice Ste-

25

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124-26.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc, 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
27 Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
28 Id. at 349-50.
29 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 384-86 (4th ed. 2007).
30 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006)); Act of Oct. 27, 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304).
31 Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (citing The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)).
32 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26
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vens reminded that the privilege is not “designed to provide a special
private benefit . . . [but instead] is a means by which an important
34
public purpose may be achieved.”
That purpose was recognized from the beginning of copyright.
Not long after the Statute of Anne appeared, courts in England began
recognizing that certain uses of copyrighted material would not infringe the rights of authors. The doctrine, first referred to as “fair
abridgement,” later became known as “fair use.”
A. Fair Use
Behind the fair use doctrine is the idea that if copyright protection bestows the benefits of intellectual property rights on authors and
artists in order to stimulate the resulting intellectual and cultural
enrichment for all of society,35 these rights should be counterbalanced
in the interest of the thinkers and creators who follow in their footsteps. The idea dates back at least 200 years, to Lord Mansfield’s
statement in Sayre v. Moore36:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their
time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of
their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour;
the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements,
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.37
Without some level of copyright protection for authors, unfettered competition from others who copy and distribute the work with
impunity would greatly hinder the author’s and publisher’s ability to
recover the costs of production. The result would be a world in which
only authors with few, if any, monetary concerns would bother creating, and publishers looking for return on their production, marketing,
and distribution investments would be loathe to play their role in the
process.38 On the other hand, to some extent, all creative work is inherently derivative of that which has come before, and in areas like
philosophy, history, journalism, and criticism, secondary works are
inherently referential.39 Fair use, then, allows for these secondary uses

34

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
See Leval, supra note 3, at 1109. At the time he wrote this article, Leval was a United
States District Court judge in the Southern District of New York. Today he is a judge on the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
36 Cary v. Longman, (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 138 (K.B) 140 n.b; 1 East 358, 362 n.b.
37 Id. at 140.
38 Netanel, supra note 4, at 292-93.
39 See generally Leval, supra note 3.
35
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40
where they in some way further artistic or scientific progress, the
ultimate, Constitutional goal of copyright law. In other words, fair
41
use “is a necessary part of the overall design.”
Fair use had been part of the common law for more than a century when it was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.42 The statute
set out the doctrine as a four-part test, which traces its roots back to
43
Folsom v. Marsh, an 1841 copyright infringement case involving a
biographer of George Washington named Jared Sparks, whose The
Writings of George Washington included the former president’s official and private correspondence, addresses, messages, and other papers. Nearly 400 of the book’s 866 pages were copied verbatim from
Washington’s personal records. The decision, written by Justice Story, formed the eventual basis of the four factors to be considered
when evaluating a secondary work’s infringing qualities:

1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value
of, the copyrighted work.44
In addition to acting as a kind of First Amendment counterweight to the monopolistic tendencies of copyright, another advantage
of fair use is that its protections are designed to be broad. Copyrighted material has long been re-purposed in areas of research and
commentary; recent decades have seen the doctrine expand to allow
technological uses like videotaping, photocopying, software, reverse
engineering, and search engineering.45 The flexibility of fair use
makes it particularly adaptable to an era of rapid technological metamorphosis.

40

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Leval, supra note 3, at 1110.
42 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006)).
43 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
44 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
45 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1993); Field
v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
41
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For example, within a decade of its incorporation into the United
States copyright statutes in 1976, fair use played a key role in legitimizing the emergence of a new technology: video cassette recorders
46
(VCRs). In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions brought a contributory infringement action against Sony and several retailers of its Betamax recorders on the premise that the new devices allowed others to
infringe their copyrighted television programming. Sony’s own survey
showed that the primary consumer use of the VCR was “timeshifting,” a nifty bit of jargon coined to describe the now ubiquitous
practice “of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and
47
thereafter erasing it.” Although some infringing uses of VCRs were
acknowledged, the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s finding
that even if there had been infringing home-use recording of copyrighted material, the VCR could still be legally used to record noncopyrighted material or material whose owners consented to the copying.48 An injunction, the Court held, would deprive the public of
49
access to the VCR for such non-infringing uses. It was a resounding
victory for fair use.
B.

The Challenges of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine

While the objective of fair use is clear, its exact prescription in
practice is less so. Even as he groped his way to articulating what became the basis for the fair use doctrine, Justice Story lamented the
difficulties inherent in its application: “Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the
distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile [sic] and refined, and,
50
sometimes, almost evanescent.” He continued:
[W]hat constitutes a fair and bona fide abridgment, in the sense
of the law, is one of the most difficult points, under particular circumstances, which can well arise for judicial discussion. It is
clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of
the original work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass,
will not be held to be such an abridgment. There must be real,
substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor
and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of
46
47
48
49
50

464 U.S. 417.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 454-56.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the
51
chief value of the original work.
Just where the line is to be drawn between intellectual laboring
and facile scissoring — cutting and pasting, in today’s parlance — continues to bedevil the courts.
“What is most curious about this doctrine is that neither the decisions that have applied it for nearly 300 years, nor its eventual statutory formulation, undertook to define or explain its contours.”52 Even
the U.S. Copyright Office itself notes that the line between fair use
53
and infringement can be fuzzy. Critics routinely bemoan the doctrine’s lack of precision and predictability.54 So do judges.55 “It is de
rigeur to begin a scholarly discussion by quoting one of the judicial
laments that fair use defies definition . . . before going on to define it
anyway. The field is littered with the corpses of overturned opinions.”56 As common law, fair use was mercurial, but when Congress
incorporated the doctrine into the Copyright laws, it did nothing to
curb its expansive nature:
Congress adopted three considerably inconsistent ways of doing
nothing: simple reference to fair use, specification of what is fair
use by illustrative examples, and prescription of nonexclusive
“factors to be considered” in determining whether a particular
use is fair. As Hercule Poirot observed about the murder on the
Orient Express, the problem is not that there are too few clues
but that there are too many.57
For example, while it was a landmark triumph for fair use, the
Sony decision pointed up the difficulties judges would face in applying
the statutory factors to their fair use deliberations. Without guidance
from Congress, it would be up to the judiciary, on a case-by-case basis,
to decide which factors were the most important in deciding whether a
use was defensible. The Sony Court appeared to tilt the fair use balancing test toward the economic factors, seeming to create a presumption of harm where a purported fair use was commercial in na51

Id. at 345.
Leval, supra note 3, at 1105.
53 U.S. Copyright Office — Fair Use Factsheet, FL-102, available at http://www.copyright.
gov/fls/fl102.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
54 Symposium, Fair Use: “Incredibly Shrinking” or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 571 (2008).
55 Judge Learned Hand characterized fair use as “the most troublesome in the whole law
of copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
56 Lloyd Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137 (1990).
57 Id. at 1139.
52
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ture. There, the Court had found that “time-shifting” for private use
was noncommercial, but also noted in dicta that “every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright”
and that “if the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood
58
[of economic harm] may be presumed.”
A year later, Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,59 a case involving the political magazine The Nation’s unauthorized publication of
verbatim quotations from a forthcoming memoir by former President
Gerald Ford, officially elevated the fourth factor to preeminence in
fair use deliberations. The holding in Harper & Row characterized
the “effect of the use” upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work as “undoubtedly the single most important element of
60
fair use.”
As difficult as it may be for judges to apply the doctrine, writers
and artists who seek to rely on fair use have the most to lose. This is
because creators may find it difficult to ascertain their rights to draw
61
on existing works. Overly optimistic reliance by secondary users on
a fair use defense frequently leads courts to issue injunctions against
their attempts to publish.62
In other cases, uncertainty about fair use — or even the fear of litigation despite a good faith belief that the doctrine applies — leads
some creators to decide it isn’t even worth the potential battle, especially against powerful media companies that zealously guard the
gates to their content. Lawrence Lessig describes an episode in which
documentary filmmaker Jon Else, while filming opera stagehands
playing checkers backstage, inadvertently captured four seconds of an
episode of The Simpsons playing on a television in the background, a
bit of color the filmmaker found fortuitous — at least until he was confronted with the dilemma of either trying to obtain permission to use
the copyrighted footage or claiming fair use. The Simpsons creator
Matt Groening approved, but directed Else to the Fox network, which
sought $10,000 for the use of the clip.63 Despite widespread assurances from the legal community that the footage amounted to fair use,
Else told Lessig he was also informed that “Fox would ‘depose and
58

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449, 451 (1984).
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
60 Id. at 566.
61 William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1693-94 (1988).
62 See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger
v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y 1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
63 LESSIG, supra note 10, at 96.
59
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litigate [me] to within an inch of [my] life’ regardless of the merits of
64
my claim.” He cut the footage out of his film. (Else may have benefited from the later development of the Documentary Filmmakers’
Statement of Best Practices, in which the community asserts, preemptively, certain uses of copyrighted material as fair: “quoting media in
order to critique or analyze it; quoting media to make a point about
the culture; incorporation of copyrighted works in the process of filming something else; and quoting to make a historical point.”)65
Some commentators find this especially problematic in an era of
media consolidation, where content producers own enormous inventories of existing content that they have either created or acquired,
content they can endlessly recycle at low marginal costs, all while forcing secondary authors to contemplate a perilous dilemma: invoking
fair use, or pursuing a license at a prohibitively high cost facilitated, at
least in part, by copyright protection itself.66
C.

The Derivative Right

While commentary and criticism are expressly permitted by fair
use as it was codified in 1976, the doctrine was put on a collision
course with another of copyright law’s core protections: the derivative
right. The same legislation granted copyright owners exclusive rights
to prepare derivative works based on their original creations, including translations, arrangements, versions in other media, sequels, and
“any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
67
adapted.”
This new right was a product of the Copyright Act of 1976,68
wherein Congress expanded the growing bundle of rights to include
that of adapting works in new media that had been added by the Copyright Act of 1909.69 The derivative right can be traced back to 1870,
when Congress responded to a Supreme Court decision that had
upheld the right of a German author to translate Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin by explicitly adding the right of translation
to the bundle of exclusive rights guaranteed to a copyright owner.70
64

Id. at 95-98.
Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Progress, 31 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 497, 498 (2008) (citing Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices:
Surprising Success, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, available at http://www.iptoday.com/
articles/2007-10-aufderheide.asp).
66 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001).
67 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
68 See id. § 106(2).
69 See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075.
70 Act of July 8, 1870 (“Copyright Act of 1870”), ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198.
65
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While the 1870 Act provided that “authors may reserve the right to
71
dramatize or to translate their own works,” Congress went even further in 1909, adding novelization and musicalization to the expanding
72
list of derivative rights for copyright holders.
73
Daly v. Palmer, the first derivative rights case in the United
States, marked a turning point in the dramatic expansion of copyright.
The plaintiff claimed a copyright in his play, Under the Gaslight, and
sued another playwright for infringing his “Railroad Scene,” described by the New York court:
[O]ne of the characters is represented as secured by another, and
laid helpless upon the rails of a railroad track, in such manner,
and with the presumed intent, that the railroad train, momentarily expected, shall run him down and kill him, and, just at the
moment when such a fate seems inevitable, another of the characters contrives to reach the intended victim, and to drag him
from the track as the train rushes in and passes over the spot.74
Though the scene has become, by now, abundantly familiar, at
the time the court noted, “this incident and scene was entirely novel,
and unlike any dramatic incident known to have been theretofore
represented on any stage, or invented by any author before the plaintiff so composed, produced, and represented the same.”75 The court
held that the defendant’s play, After Dark, infringed the Railroad
Scene, issuing an injunction to prevent the defendant from publicly
performing any version of the scene.76 The court held that it was “piracy” if an original work “is recognized by the spectator . . . as conveying substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the same emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order.”77 Thus, an arguably fair use could be considered infringing where underlying “impressions” were discernable by an audience. This recognition of the derivative right, soon to be codified, marked copyright law’s turn away
from encouraging progress in the arts, toward protecting the natural
78
property rights of authors.
The justifications offered for the derivative right are the same
economic arguments that underpin copyright itself: that an interest in
71

§ 86, 16 Stat. at 212.
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
73 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.N.Y. 1868).
74 Id. at 1133.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1140.
77 Id. at 1138.
78 John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural Law Copyright, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 465, 491 (2005).
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the reward that comes with derivative work serves as a necessary in79
centive for the production of such work. A secondary rationale is
that the right to control the use of her creation, including any derivative use, is a matter of an author’s moral or natural rights.
But the derivative right casts a heavy shadow over the defense to
copyright infringement represented by fair use. In reality, as it has
been interpreted by judges, much of the derivative right is already
encompassed in the expansive rights of reproduction, particularly in
light of a Ninth Circuit decision in 1970 that construed the reproduction right to include works that did not literally copy but merely
evoked the same “total concept and feel” as the original.80 Because an
important element of the inquiry into infringement of both rights is
the “substantial similarity” test, infringement of the derivative right
almost automatically entails infringement of the reproduction right,
because a derivative work inevitably borrows some aspect of the original that will likely be independently copyrightable.81
Considered in tandem, both rights represented a dramatic enlargement of copyright protection beyond its roots, one that “would
seem most bizarre to our framers, though it has become second nature
to us.”82 Indeed, for the first century of copyright law, authors could
freely borrow from existing works, provided they made significant
83
contributions and didn’t usurp demand for the original work. The
expansion of copyright into derivative uses represents a fundamental
recharacterization: What once was part of the public domain, in the
form of ideas, is now considered protected, in the form of expression.84
The Ninth Circuit embraced the broad derivative right in 1988.
85
In Abend v. MCA, the holder of the copyright to It Had to be Murder, the story upon which Alfred Hitchcock based his 1954 film Rear
Window, sued over the re-release of the movie in theaters, on television, and on videocassette. MCA had acquired the original rights to
produce the film for $10,000, but Abend claimed that the re-release
interfered with his derivative rights to produce other works, including
a proposed play for HBO.86 The Court of Appeals for the Second
79

Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1215

(1996).
80

Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines,
90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 335 (2005).
82 LESSIG, supra note 10, at 138.
83 See Netanel, supra note 4, at 301-02 (citing the case of a German author whose translation of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin did not constitute copyright infringement).
84 Id. at 304.
85 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988).
86 Id. at 1468.
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Circuit denied MCA’s fair use claim and further stated that Abend
was entitled to damages based on “[a]ny impairment of [his] ability to
87
produce new derivative works” resulting from the film’s re-release.
The Rear Window case established the nearly boundless extent of a
copyright holder’s derivative rights.
Taken as a whole, these new and expanding rights create a gauntlet any potentially transformative fair use will have difficulty navigating. It has been observed that Leonard Bernstein’s Broadway musical
West Side Story may have infringed Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet
were it protected by copyright today, and T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land
might have suffered a similar fate were its source material not spread
across the centuries.88
II. TRANSFORMATION AS FAIR USE
Beginning in the 1990s, courts began to grapple with tests of fair
use that moved beyond technological (Sony) and journalistic (Harper
& Row) invocations of the doctrine to cases involving artistic expression. Where courts had once evaluated fair use largely in terms of
market harm, requiring judges to think like economists, fair use determinations involving potentially transformative uses now involved
judges in the act of critical interpretation. This put judges in precisely
the position that Oliver Wendell Holmes had warned against in 1903:
that “persons trained only to the law [might] constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of [a work of art] . . . [denying copyright protection] to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the
judge.”89
Over a series of cases, courts have been forced to define “transformation” for the purposes of fair use analysis, as applied to the visual arts, popular music, photography, and literature. While circuit
courts have weighed in on the former and the latter, the Supreme
Court has yet to define the contours of transformative fair use in a
purely literary context. Transformative fair use decisions necessarily
involve the court in an enterprise of criticism, evaluating the relative
artistic merits of the works of secondary authors in an attempt to separate original works from free riding ones. This role - court as critic is unusual, but given the doctrine we have, inevitable.

87
88
89

Id. at 1479 (remanding to the district court for the calculation of such damages).
Netanel, supra note 4, at 303 (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 23).
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
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A. Rogers v. Koons: Puppies and Parody
In 1991, a professional photographer named Art Rogers brought
a copyright infringement suit against visual artist Jeff Koons, who had
used a photograph called “Puppies,” an image of a couple holding a
litter of German Sheperd puppies, to create a sculpture called “String
of Puppies,” part of an exhibition he called “The Banality Show.”
Koons had seen the image on a note card, and viewed the picture as a
part of the mass culture “resting in the collective sub-consciousness of
people regardless of whether the card had actually ever been seen by
90
such people.” Rogers’s photo became the basis for one of a series of
puppy sculptures, which were displayed at New York City’s Sonnabend Gallery in 1988. (The gallery was also named as a defendant in
the suit.)
Koons cited fair use. The artist argued that his sculpture was a
satire of society at large, a form of social criticism that drew upon the
Cubist and Dada movements and artists like Marcel Duchamp, parodying the mass production of commodities and media images by in91
corporating them into works of art.
The court began its fair use analysis where the Harper & Row
court left off, having declared that the effect of the secondary use on
the potential market of a copyrighted work was “undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use.”92 The Rogers court posited
the first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use, as a question
of “whether the original was copied in good faith to benefit the public
or primarily for the commercial interests of the infringer. . . . Knowing
exploitation of a copyrighted work for personal gain militates against
93
a finding of fair use.”
This emphasis on public benefit was loading the deck. Finding
the nature and purpose of the use by Koons to be commercial, and
even in bad faith, the court was still bound to explore the sculpture’s
artistic claims. In so doing, the court played the role of art critic, and
added a criterion to the legal definition of a parody: “the copied work
must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there
would be no need to conjure up the original work.”94 Koons’s “String
of Puppies” may have commented on a materialistic society, the court
conceded, but there was no discernable parody of “Puppies” itself to
be found within it.

90
91
92
93
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Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 309.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309.
Id. at 310.
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Whether the court was ever prepared to evaluate Koons’s art in a
light favorable to the artist — i.e., to give the artist the benefit of the
doubt when he claimed his aim was to spoof — is doubtful. The opening paragraph of the decision suggests the court was not eager to play
art critic, and would instead view the case through a more populist
lens:
The key to this copyright infringement suit, brought by a plaintiff
photographer against a defendant sculptor and the gallery
representing him, is defendants’ borrowing of plaintiff’s expression of a typical American scene — a smiling husband and wife
holding a litter of charming puppies. The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that defendants resolved so long as they were
significant players in the art business, and the copies they produced bettered the price of the copied work by a thousand to
one, their piracy of a less well-known artist’s work would escape
being sullied by an accusation of plagiarism.95
The judge seemed primed to turn Holmes’s admonition against
artistic elitism on its head, instead aiming his derision at high, rather
than low, art. Indeed, the ruling, which affirmed the lower court’s
issuance of an injunction against further manufacture, sale, or display
of “String of Puppies,”96 decisively rejected Koons’s fair use defense:
“[T]here is simply nothing in the record to support a view that Koons
produced ‘String of Puppies’ for anything other than sale as highpriced art. Hence, the likelihood of future harm to Rogers’ photograph is presumed, and plaintiff's market for his work has been preju97
diced.”
B.

2 Live Crew, Pretty Woman, and Parody as Transformation

A few years after Koons lost his court battle, parody was sanctioned by the high court as a “transformative” fair use, in a decision
whose logic derived largely from a highly influential article about fair
98
use by Pierre N. Leval, then a judge on the U.S. District Court for
99
the Southern District of New York. In the seminal case Campbell v.
100
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that rap group 2
95

Id. at 303.
Pursuant to § 503 of the Copyright Act, the district court had ordered Koons to “turnover” all extant copies of “String of Puppies.” Instead, the artist shipped them to a museum
Germany, and was held in contempt of court.
97 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312.
98 See Leval, supra note 3.
99 Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 451 (2008); see also Leval, supra note 3.
100 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman was a lawful
form of commentary on the original.
While the district court had allowed this fair use defense proffered by 2 Live Crew, the Sixth Circuit, in overturning the decision,
signaled the long shadow of the Sony dicta’s commercial considerations on fair use deliberations. (Indeed, a recent history of fair use
decisions supports the idea that, like a pendulum, courts over time
swing back and forth between the first and fourth factors; sometimes
the purpose and character of the use is ascendant, while at other times
101
the market impact is the key determination.) Under the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, “[i]f sold for money, [a secondary work] will be
deemed commercial and presumptively unfair . . . the first factor not
only may but must be resolved against fair use where the use is commercial.”102
While the first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use,
has an economic dimension (insofar as the statute asks whether the
use is commercial or noncommercial, as the Sony court pointed out),
in 1994 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Campbell’s appeal
and took the opportunity to amplify this “content” factor. In its decision, the Campbell Court betrayed the influence of Judge Leval’s article and marked a return to Justice Story’s original fair use formulation:
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new work merely “supercedes the objects” of the original creation, or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.”103
The Court decided, for the first time,104 that parody could be considered fair use, even where it was a commercial one: “[P]arody has
an obvious claim to transformative value . . . . [T]he heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at
105
Having found
least in part, comments on that author’s works.”
101

See generally Beebe, supra note 7.
William Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profits, Presumptions, and
Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 712 (1993) (emphasis added).
103 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
104 “This Court has only once before even considered whether parody may be fair use, and
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Campbell’s composition sufficiently parodic, however, the Court declined to assess its merits:
[W]e will not take the further step of evaluating its quality. The
threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is
whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.
Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or bad does
not and should not matter to fair use. As Justice Holmes explained, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of [a work of art], outside of the narrowest and most
106
obvious limits.”
The Court quoted Holmes’s opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co.107 Were judges to assess artistic merit, Holmes had
written, “copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest
of any public, they have a commercial value; it would be bold to say
that they have not an aesthetic and educational value — and the taste
of any public is not to be treated with contempt.”108
C.

The Wind Done Gone: Defining, Refining “Parody”

In 2001, author Alice Randall completed The Wind Done Gone, a
retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s Civil War epic Gone With the Wind
from the perspective of a slave on Scarlett O’Hara’s plantation. The
owners of the copyright in Gone With the Wind, the Mitchell Trust,
sued in district court in Atlanta to enjoin publication of Randall’s
book. In a declaration filed with the district court, Randall stated that
her purpose in writing the book was to create “a literary parody . . .
that stood in ironic relationship to the [original] . . . [to] turn Gone
With the Wind inside out and skewer that work’s profound deficiencies
109
and distortions,” particularly its use of racial stereotypes. Publisher
Houghton Mifflin argued that, as a parody, The Wind Done Gone fell
within the fair use exception, but the district court disagreed, granting
the Trust’s motion for a preliminary injunction.110
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Id. at 582.
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
108 Id. at 251-52.
109 Declaration of Alice Randall ¶ 2, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp.
2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01 CV-701-CAP), available at http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.
com/features/randall_url/pdf/Declaration_Alice_Randall.pdf.
110 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 2001),
rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
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The lower court allowed that The Wind Done Gone was a transformative parody, but found it insufficiently transformative to overcome the Mitchell Trust’s derivative rights in Gone With the Wind,
which would enfold any sequel rights. The court found The Wind
Done Gone to be composed primarily of the original, with few additions or changes, and therefore found Randall’s to be a superseding
111
use that merely fulfilled demand for the original.
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunction.
112
The court cited the importance of a “free flow of ideas,” and found
the injunction to be “at odds with the shared principles of the First
Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior restraint on
113
speech.” Relying heavily on the jurisprudence of Campbell, including the notion “that courts should not judge the quality of the work or
the success of the attempted humor in discerning its parodic character,” the court noted that decision’s bifurcated definition of parody:
“The Supreme Court’s definition of parody in Campbell, however, is
somewhat vague. On the one hand, the Court suggests that the aim of
parody is ‘comic effect or ridicule,’ but it then proceeds to discuss parody more expansively in terms of its ‘commentary’ on the original.”114
Importantly, the Eleventh Circuit decided to take the broad view
of parody, defining it as a work whose “aim is to comment upon or
criticize a prior work by appropriating elements of the original in
creating a new artistic, as opposed to scholarly or journalistic,
115
work.” The court placed particular emphasis on the need to avoid
subjective inquiries, noting that both plaintiff and defendant had attempted to sway the court with critiques of Randall’s humor. “The
benefit of our approach to ‘parody,’ which requires no assessment of
whether or not a work is humorous, is apparent from the arguments
made by the parties in this case. . . . Under our approach, we may . . .
simply bypass what would always be a wholly subjective inquiry.”116
The court’s analysis found The Wind Done Gone to be principally
a work of criticism whose objective was to lampoon and refute the
racist and romanticized antebellum South depicted by Mitchell.

111

Id. at 1378 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89).
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268.
113 Id. at 1277.
114 Id. at 1268.
115 Id. at 1268-69.
116 Id. at 1269, n.23 (“Suntrust quotes Michiko Kakutani’s review of TWDG in the New
York Times, in which she states that the work is ‘decidedly unfunny.’ Houghton Mifflin, on the
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It is clear within the first fifty pages . . . that Randall’s work flips
Gone With the Wind’s traditional race roles, portrays powerful
whites as stupid or feckless, and generally sets out to demystify
Gone With the Wind and strip the romanticism from Mitchell’s
specific account of this period of our history. Approximately the
last half of The Wind Done Gone tells a completely new story
that, although involving characters based on Gone With the Wind
characters, features plot elements found nowhere within the cov117
ers of Gone With the Wind.
While the court spent the bulk of its fair use analysis on the purpose and character of use test, it also found it unlikely that Randall’s
work would act as a market substitute or harm Gone With the Wind’s
derivative uses in any way.
The importance of the SunTrust decision lies in the Eleventh Circuit’s embrace of the Campbell court’s broad definition of parody.
The court’s definition of parody sets objective parameters, and, importantly, disavowed literary criticism; one commentator finds the
court’s definition of parody the rightful heir to the standards first espoused in Campbell.118 To have ruled otherwise would have placed
the fair use analysis within the narrow and subjective constraints of
evaluating the work’s comedic success.
Instead, as the court recognized, the essential inquiry is whether,
using parody as its vehicle, a later work comments on or criticizes the
original upon which it is based. This, the court seems to say, is the
core definition of parody, and it is crucial that “the definition of parody — against which the theme, language, purpose, and style of disputed
works are to be measured — have some objective content because the
definitions of these elements of writing are difficult to state with precision, especially for those trained in law rather than literature.”119
The approach reinforces the essential test in Justice Story’s original formulation of fair use a century and a half ago: whether a later
work is intellectually fresh, or a mere cut-and-paste job. The true inquiry, under fair use’s first factor, is “whether the work supplants the
120
original, or whether it transforms it into a new work.” In one sense,
the case brings fair use full circle; in another sense, it represents a
pushing back against the ever-expanding protections of copyright.
Whether The Wind Done Gone is “destined to influence Fair Use and
117

Id. at 1270.
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119 Id. at 2369.
120 Jeffrey D. Grossett, The Wind Done Gone: Transforming Tara into a Plantation Parody,
52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (2002).
118

2010]

The Transformation Test

143

parody litigation, particularly in the field of literature,” as one com121
mentator has contended, remains to be seen.
D. Blanch: The Koons Comeback
A 2006 case also involving Koons, tried by the same court, suggests a growing judicial acceptance of transformative fair use. In
Blanch v. Koons,122 a fashion photographer sued the artist for copyright infringement after Koons incorporated one of her images, a depiction of a pair of legs called Silk Sandals, into a painting called Niagara. Acknowledging that the court had “declined to find a transformative use when the defendant has done no more than find a new way
to exploit the creative virtues of the original work,”123 the court went
on to confirm the transformative qualities of Koons’s work:
The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and
Blanch had in creating, ‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative nature of the use. . . . When, as here, the copyrighted work is
used as ‘raw material,’ in the furtherance of distinct creative or
communicative objectives, the use is transformative.124
The court went on to note that a finding of substantial transformation reduced the significance of the other three statutory fair use
factors.125
Importantly, the court also appeared to broaden the constraining
distinction between parody (lawful fair use) and satire (unlawful fair
use) that the Supreme Court had delineated in Campbell. The Campbell court had noted that a parody depended on use of the original
because the original was its subject, and thus had to be recognized as
such; satire, it held, was something else, which “stood on its own.”126
In Blanch, however, the court suggests satire that has its object
beyond the employed copyrighted matter can still claim fair use:
“Koons’s use of a slick fashion photograph enables him to satirize life
as it appears when we see it through the prism of slick fashion photography.”127 The court’s choice to recognize Niagara as satire, rather
than parody, marks a significant shift.
If anything has changed since the court last ruled on Koons’s art,
it seems to be not the art itself, but rather the court’s attitude toward
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at 1127.
467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 254.
Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581. (1994).
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255 (emphasis added).
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transformative uses. Koons’s aim in Niagara, after all — to provide
“commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass me128
dia” — was not so different from what his goal had been in the
“String of Puppies” case: signaling his belief that “the mass production of commodities and media images has caused a deterioration in
129
the quality of society.” Peter Jaszi has written that the Blanch decision suggests that, today, “transformativeness figures as a kind of metaconsideration arching over the fair use analysis.”130
E.

Gaylord: Transformation by the Postal Service

In 2002, the United States Postal Service (USPS) decided to issue
a thirty-seven-cent postage stamp commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the armistice of the Korean War. The stamp featured a
photograph by John Alli of stainless steel soldier sculptures, called
“The Column,” that are part of the Korean War Veterans Memorial
located on the national mall in Washington, D.C. Frank C. Gaylord
II, the World War II veteran who created the sculpture, sued the
USPS in Federal Claims Court, alleging that the stamp infringed his
exclusive copyright in the sculpture and seeking a royalty of ten percent on the net sales of the commemorative stamp and related merchandise.131
The court rejected out of hand the USPS’s claim that the sculpture itself was a joint work, and that, because it was commissioned by
the government, its copyright was also at least partially owned by the
132
government. But it went on to weigh the agency’s claim of fair use,
finding it to be transformative:
[T]hrough his photographic talents, [Alli] transformed this expression and message, creating a surrealistic environment with
snow and subdued lighting where the viewer is left unsure
whether he is viewing a photograph of statues or actual human
beings. . . . Alli’s efforts resulted in a work that has a new and different character than “The Column” and is thus a transformative
work . . . [and] the Postal Service further transformed the character and expression of “The Column” when creating the Stamp.133
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While the court went on to analyze the stamp in the context of
the other fair use factors, including the stamp’s impact on the poten134
tial market for sculptor’s market in similar works, it was clear that it
was transformation — as employed by photographer and Postal Service
alike, and rhapsodized by Judge Thomas C. Wheeler — that carried the
day.
The Salinger Court Takes Literary Criticism to New Judicial
Heights

F.

J.D. Salinger published Catcher in the Rye in 1951, and in the
half-century since, the iconic novel and its reclusive author have been
the subject of widespread admiration and fascination. While originally published for adults, the novel became a classic text in high schools
everywhere, although it was frequently banned (and still is, from time
135
Its protagonist, Holden Caulfield, became the prototype
to time).
for disaffected youth of the post-war era. “Most critics who looked at
The Catcher in the Rye at the time of its publication thought that its
language was a true and authentic rendering of teenage colloquial
136
speech.” More than 35 million copies of the book have been sold,
and Catcher is estimated to rank as one of the tenth or fifteenth most
commonly read novels in American classrooms.137 In 2005, Time magazine named the book one of the 100 best English-language novels
138
published since 1923.
The recent death of J.D. Salinger highlighted the extent to which
the author’s cultural profile was at odds with that of his antihero: “Salinger . . . turned his back on success and adulation, becoming the
Garbo of letters, famous for not wanting to be famous.”139 As Salinger’s public persona waned, that of his creation waxed, and in the
half-century after the book was published, the author all but disappeared from public view. This was by choice: The words “reclusive
134

Id. at 69-71.
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Association, 100 Most Frequently Challenged Books: 1990-1999, http://www.ala.org/ala/
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author” can almost always be found appended to the name “J.D. Sa140
linger,” and the novelist vigorously defended his privacy. Salinger’s
fame, the iconic status of his most beloved work, and his near-hermit
like existence and protection of his privacy have combined over the
past two-and-a-half decades to create a sort of perfect storm of copy141
right case law in the area of fair use.
In 2009, Salinger’s attorneys, armed with copyright infringement
claims, sought a preliminary injunction against Swedish author Fredrik Colting, who had written a sort-of sequel to Catcher in the Rye
called 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye.142 Writing under the
dubious pen name J.D. California, the author’s main character, “Mr.
C,” clearly an aged Holden Caulfield, escapes from a retirement home
and embarks on a series of adventures that roughly parallel the plot of
Catcher in the Rye. The novel’s later chapters depict the aged Caulfield confronting his creator, Salinger himself. On July 1, 2009, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York — the same
court that had found fair use grounds to justify Ian Hamilton’s biographical use of Salinger’s letters in 1986 — granted Salinger a preliminary injunction against the publication of Colting’s book.
Leaning heavily on Campbell and, to a lesser extent, the SunTrust
decision, the district court began its fair use inquiry by determining
whether the new book’s “parodic character may reasonably be per143
ceived.” It quickly found the answer to be no: “[T]he Court finds
such contentions to be post-hoc rationalizations employed through
vague generalizations about the alleged naivete of the original, rather
than reasonably perceivable parody.”144 60 Years Later was no parody,
the court held, because it “contains no reasonably discernable re145
joinder or specific criticism of any character or theme of Catcher.”
146
While labels are not dispositive, Colting hadn’t done himself any
favors with his jacket copy, of which the court took note: “Until the
present lawsuit was filed, Defendants made no indication that 60 Years
140

A Nov. 3, 2009, search of Westlaw’s news database yielded 506 such pairings dating back

to 1981.
141 In Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987), the author successfully
prosecuted a copyright infringement claim against biographer Ian Hamilton when Hamilton
attempted to quote from Salinger’s early letters in his unauthorized biography.
142 JOHN DAVID CALIFORNIA, 60 YEARS LATER: COMING THROUGH THE RYE (2009).
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Cir. 2010) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994)).
144 Id. at 258.
145 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
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was in any way a parody . . . . Quite to the contrary, the original jacket
of 60 Years states that it is ‘. . . a marvelous sequel to one of our most
147
beloved classics.’”
The opinion reveals just how fine a line a court must navigate between “discerning parody” (a potentially fair form of transformation)
and employing literary criticism. While judges have long admonished
each other against the latter, Colting makes it apparent how difficult it
may be in practice to avoid literary critique in fair use deliberations.
For example, in her analysis, District Judge Deborah Batts examined
themes common to Salinger’s original and Colting’s derivative work,
basing her estimation that the latter lacked transformative value on
that very commonality. Colting’s claims to augment the portrait of
Caulfield in Catcher by showing the effects of the character’s uncompromising world view, the judge writes, were unpersuasive because
those effects were already thoroughly depicted and apparent in Salinger’s own narrative. “It is hardly parodic to repeat that same exercise
in contrast, just because society and the characters have aged.”148 As a
later amicus brief put it, “The District Court . . . applied an unduly
149
restrictive fair use standard by acting as a literary critic.”
Judge Batts seems to say that, for a work to be transformative,
characters must evolve in order to create new themes and facilitate
new meaning. By this logic, Colting’s gambit — that Caulfield’s character would not change over the years, and that he would therefore
come to seem, to readers who once admired him, more pathetic than
endearing — was doomed to failure. “[T]o the extent Colting . . . is
attempting to accentuate how Holden’s emotional growth would ultimately be stunted by his unwillingness to compromise his principles or
engage with ‘the phonies,’ they were again simply rehashing one of
150
the critical extant themes of Catcher.” The statement is illustrative
of the perils of judge-as-critic: Judge Batts has substituted her judgment — that to depict Holden Caulfield as an insufficiently developed
character is an act of artistic expression unworthy of fair use protection — for that of the author-defendant, as well as his potential readers.
Colting appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
arguing several grounds on which the injunction should be vacated,
including that the order constituted unlawful prior restraint, and that
147

Id. at 260 n.3.
Id. at 259.
149 Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Association et al. at 4, Salinger v. Colting, 607
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-cv), 2009 WL 6865321.
150 See Posting of Peter Friedman to Geniocity,
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the court had failed to apply the controlling preliminary injunction
151
standards. These require the plaintiff to establish (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
On April 30, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case, agreeing that the lower court had applied incorrect
preliminary injunction standards. But on the first element, the likelihood of success on the merits, the court of appeals stacked the deck,
holding that there was “not clear error” in the district court’s rejection
of the fair use defense.152 “It may be that a court can find that the fair
use factor favors a defendant even when the defendant and his work
lack a transformative purpose,” the court posited, before setting that
question aside.153
In death, Salinger remains a figure of public fascination, but popular sentiment runs against his lawsuit. One writer lamented: “Holden remains in a specimen jar in schoolbook closets across the country
154
— a shameful fate.” In its Week in Review section shortly after the
decision, The New York Times opined:
The books that get re-written and re-imagined are beloved. We
don’t want them ever to be over. We pay them the great compliment of imagining they’re almost real: that there must be more to
the story, and that characters we know so well . . . must have
more to their lives.155
The Times — along with the Associated Press and Gannett Newspapers — took a more strident approach in an amicus brief, filed with
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in support of vacating
the injunction against Colting’s book.156 “The only harm” that might
stem from allowing publication of 60 Years Later, the brief stated,
“appears to be to the pride of a reclusive author in not having his desires fulfilled.”157

151 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 24, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010)
(No. 09-2878-cv), 2009 WL 6865322, at *24.
152 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
153 Id.
154 See Igler, supra note 137.
155 Charles McGrath, The Sincerest Form of Lawsuit Bait, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009.
156 Brief for Amicus Curiae New York Times et al. on Behalf of Defendants-Appellants,
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-cv), 2009 WL 6865320.
157 Id. at *1.

The Transformation Test

2010]

149

III. THE FUTURE OF FAIR USE
As a 2008 symposium at Columbia University concluded, “Fair
158
A resulting law review article offered a
use reform is in the air.”
simple proposal for reform; there are many. As Jed Rubenfeld noted
in 2002, “Copyright law is today in the same position, vis a vis the
159
First Amendment, as libel was before New York Times v. Sullivan.”
Rubenfeld’s point was that the courts must work to limit the reach of
copyright law in the interest of artistic freedom, as they did libel law
in the seminal press freedom case. As one lay critic of copyright law
put it:
Viewed up close, copyright . . . looks like a constantly expanding
government program run for the benefit of a noisy, wellorganized interest group — like Superfund, say, or dairy subsidies,
except that the benefits go not to endangered homeowners or
hard-working farmers but to the likes of Barbra Streisand and
Eminem. . . . Copyright is a trial lawyer’s dream — a regulatory
program enforced by private lawsuits where the plaintiffs have
all the advantages, from injury-free damage awards to liability
doctrines that extract damages from anyone who was in the
neighborhood when an infringement occurred.160
A. Fixing Fair Use
What most reform proposals have in common is the aim of limiting copyright’s scope by expanding the protections of fair use. Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman propose the adoption of legal
fair use “safe harbors,” which would allow the lesser of fifteen percent
or 300 words copied from any work greater than 100 words in the case
of literary works, ten percent or ten seconds in the case of sound re161
Wendy Gordon long ago proposed a “market failure”
cordings.
approach that would find fair use where (1) there is market failure; (2)
a transfer of copyright (or a finding of fair use) is socially desirable;
162
and (3) that use would not cause substantial injury. (The problem
with the approach, in a case such as Salinger’s, is that it doesn’t recognize market failure as a result of an author’s “non-dissemination mo-

158
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163
tive.”) Still other ideas posit the creation of fair use tribunals with
judges capable of limiting liability and issuing no-action letters.164
A common thread among fair use reform proposals is far simpler:
Fix the existing four-part statutory test, perhaps by reducing that test
to parts one and four: nature of use and economic impact. Indeed, a
statistical analysis of fair use decisions of the last three decades suggests that courts are already effectively doing so; the other two factors
rarely have an impact on the outcome of fair use decisions.165 In fact,
critics say, the more factors there are, the more difficult it becomes to
166
determine which factors are important. Reducing the test to these
factors boils fair use down to its essential question: Would the pro167
posed use increase social value more than it diminishes it?
Another proposal calls for separating the transformation “test”
from fair use determinations, resulting in a second affirmative defense
to copyright infringement claims. John Tehranian suggests fair use as
the first line of defense, because it immunizes defendants from liability; as a next line of defense, however, a finding of “transformative
use” would result in intermediate liability. The secondary authordefendant would be required to register her work as a transformative
use — including parody, satire, sampling, and other forms of appropriation art — with the Copyright Office, and a judicial finding of transformative use would exempt that author from damages or injunctive
relief. Instead, the “original author of the copyrighted work and the
transformative user of that work would evenly divide all profits resulting from the commercial exploitation” of the later work.168 As Tehranian acknowledges, however, creating a distinct, statutory “transformative use” defense would require revisiting the derivative right, because the two concepts are frequently incompatible.169

B.

Enjoining the Injunction

Another common thread in the fair use debate is an increasing
aversion to preliminary injunctions as remedies in some kinds of cop163

Id. at 1632.
See Michael Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); David Nimmer, A
Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11
(2006).
165 See Beebe, supra note 7.
166 Liu, supra note 158, at 574.
167 See generally Fisher, supra note 61; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:
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169 Id. at 1248 (“[T]he broad exclusive right of copyright holders to prepare derivative
works has swallowed up the ability of transformative users to escape infringement liability.”).
164

2010]

The Transformation Test

151

yright infringement suits. Injunctive relief has largely become the
default remedy, as illustrated by the SunTrust and Colting cases and
others where defendants have engaged in creative adaptation rather
170
than literal copying. Indeed, the injunction was once disfavored in
copyright jurisprudence.171 It was eschewed in Abend, where the court
stated: “[T]here may be a strong public interest in the publication of
the secondary work [and] the copyright owner's interest may be adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringement
172
is found.” The Supreme Court also admonished against this reliance
on injunctive relief, in dicta, in Campbell:
Because the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of
judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing in cases involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also wish to
bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law . . . are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when
parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.173
Judge Leval, who now sits on the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, where the Colting case was decided, has propounded
the idea that, if a secondary work is derivative, the court should not
issue an injunction. Instead, an “action for profit allocation” may be
the solution, which sounds a lot like Tehranian’s intermediate liability
scheme. Disparaging the injunction as an overly automatic remedy in
copyright cases, especially considering that prior restraint represents
such an affront to First Amendment principles, Leval argues the law
should distinguish between piracy and reasonable contentions of fair
use.174 Transformation, it has been argued, represents one such reasonable contention:
Some view transformation as no wrong at all — they believe that
our law, as the framers penned it, should not protect derivative
rights at all. . . . [I]t seems plain that whatever wrong is involved
is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy. Yet
copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way.
I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my

170 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L. J. 147, 149 (1998).
171 Id. at 156-57.
172 Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d, Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207 (1990) (finding “special circumstances” that would cause “great injustice” to

defendants and “public injury” were an injunction to issue).
173
174
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book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your trans175
formative use of my book.
In 2006, the Supreme Court in eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
admonished courts for being too quick to provide injunctions in patent cases, and said that the same rules of equity applied in the copyright context as well.176 The Court vacated a court of appeals decision
granting injunctive relief in a patent dispute after the lower court articulated a “’general rule,’ unique to patent disputes, that a permanent
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been ad177
judged.” In other words, irreparable harm is no longer presumed in
copyright cases, but rather must be proven. “Like the Patent Act, the
Copyright Act provides that courts ‘may’ grant injunctive relief on
such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.’ . . . [T]his Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an
injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has
been infringed.”178
Perhaps following this edict, the Southern District of New York
in 2008 denied an injunction to Yoko Ono Lennon when she sued to
prohibit further distribution of a film that used fifteen seconds of John
Lennon’s “Imagine” without her permission.179 “Defendants’ use of
‘Imagine’ is transformative because their purpose is to criticize the
song’s message,” the court stated, adding that “plaintiffs have not
shown that the balance of hardships decidedly favors them.”180
C.

Narrowing the Derivative Right

Another approach to restoring fair use balance is a proposal to
constrain the wide-reaching derivative right. Glynn Lunney has dismantled the natural rights argument for the derivative right.181 Taking
an economics-based approach, Lunney compares the natural rights
arguments involving authorship to a theoretically analogous right in
other forms of property, noting, “Any number of people labor to produce products which then become inputs for someone else’s labor.”182
If every end product required a license from someone in that chain of
175

LESSIG, supra note 10, at 139.
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177 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94.
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production, then economic activity would be choked. In other words,
do authors owe a portion of their profits to the typewriter or wordprocessing software makers who were part of their process? If not,
the theory goes, derivative authors should not owe original creators,
either.
Another commentator has suggested that the broad protections
afforded by the derivative right are also inconsistent with its economic
incentive rationale. Stewart Sterk has said that for the economic incentives argument to hold sway, two conditions must be present:
First, the return of investment on the original work is so small as to
call into question the rationality of its production in the first place.
And second, the return of investment on the derivative must be sufficiently large to overcome both the low return on the original and the
subsequent cost of producing the derivative.183 As Sterk points out,
the rare scenario most likely to produce such conditions is the licensing of movie rights, and the likelihood of any first author realizing
such a windfall is “infinitesimally small.”184
It is true that eliminating the exclusive derivative right would undermine the incentive that copyright provides for the creation of the
original work,185 particularly where an adaptation maintains the essential content of the original work in the same or another form, as in a
translation. Additionally, without a derivative right, authors would be
unlikely to create derivative works, such as movies, that require time
to produce and significant capital investment, since they could not be
assured of coming to market first.
But the scope of the derivative right, Lunney argues, should be
akin to the original scope of the reproduction right: Copyright law
under the reproduction right should prohibit exact duplication; copyright law under the derivative right should prohibit exact derivative
works that merely recast a copyrighted work in a new language or
medium.186 Under this standard, an unauthorized film or stage adaptation infringes; an unauthorized sequel does not. “[A]ny significant
transformation of or variation from the underlying work should preclude a finding of infringement even if the underlying work remains
recognizable.”187
This effective elimination of the derivative right would come
closest to restoring to authors the freedoms they once had to create
183 Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 121516 (1996).
184 Id. at 1216.
185 Netanel, supra note 66, at 37.
186 Lunney, supra note 181, at 650.
187 Id.
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adaptations and translations of existing works, a freedom they held
until the late nineteenth century.
IV. TOWARD A TRANSFORMATION DOCTRINE
What, then, is transformation? Is it compatible with the derivative right? While the concept of transformative use is as elusive as
that of fair use, courts have drawn lines. There are essentially two
contexts for transformative use decisions: technical, and artistic. In
cases ranging from the VCR to the DVR, courts have defined the parameters of technical fair use, generally elevating the rights of consumers to access new technologies and information over the concerns
of the content companies fighting the adoption of those technologies.
In this section, I focus on the alternative line of cases that deals
with transformation in an artistic context. Additionally, I examine the
1991 Supreme Court copyright decision Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
188
Telephone Service Co., Inc., in an effort to extract principles that
might be applied to the concept of transformation. Together, this
body of case law may point the way toward the parameters of defensible transformative uses. Next, I explore the tangle of remedies found
both in copyright jurisprudence and commentary in order to propose
a workable scheme of equitable remedies in the transformation context. And lastly, I attempt to justify this approach within the larger
framework of the First Amendment considerations that should underlie copyright infringement decisions where arguable transformative
uses are in play.
A. Defining Transformation
The first step in carving out a transformation doctrine is defining
transformation itself. A distillation of the case law provides a surprisingly workable definition of a transformative fair use. Such uses tend
to fall into two categories: those that critique the original on which
they are based, and those that take the underlying work in a new direction.
The first use is fairly simple to spot. Its context has long included
commentary, but beginning with Campbell, parody and, arguably,
satire may also justify this kind of transformative use, whose aim may
be “to comment upon or criticize a prior work by appropriating elements of the original in creating a new artistic . . . work.”189

188
189
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The second transformative use can be more perplexing to evaluate, as evidenced by the courts in Rogers and Salinger. Essentially it
takes an original creation, and “adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
190
This kind of transformation results in “a
meaning, or message.”
191
work that has a new and different character” from the original upon
which it is based. If it “adds value to the original . . . [through] the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and under192
standings,” if a secondary author has “sharply different objectives”
for which she uses the copyrighted work “as ‘raw material,’ in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives,” that use is
transformative,193 and therefore is the kind of expression that is meant
to be protected by fair use.
These cases might be distilled into two relatively simple factors.
Transformation uses a copyrighted work as raw material either 1) to
comment upon or criticize the prior work, or 2) in the furtherance of
distinct creative or communicative objectives.
The cases are also relatively clear about what isn’t transformation. In these situations, it is typically the derivative right that is implicated, and such cases should be resolved in favor of the copyright
holder. A pair of New York cases, in which the publication of spin-off
books based on successful books and films was enjoined,194 show that a
secondary work cannot merely reproduce the essence of the original,
in a different format, without adding anything of substance to it. This
reading is also compatible with Campbell, where the secondary, rap
version of Pretty Woman added a derisive tone and grittier lyrics to
the original. And it even comports with Rogers v. Koons: Although
the Rogers court emphasized that the copied work must be, at least in
part, an object of the parody, another problem for the secondary work
was that it merely reproduced the original, exactly, in a different medium.195
Viewed in this light, Salinger poses perhaps the most difficult
case of artistic transformation in fair use case law to date. Each of the
questions involved in the transformation inquiry depends, to a great
extent, on a literary analysis of 60 Years Later. Must its aim be “to
190
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196
comment upon or criticize” Catcher in the Rye, or must it merely
result in someone’s idea of commentary or criticism? The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit seemed to suggest that the question —
whether there must be an intent element in the Transformation Test —
remains an open one. Another question remains, because of the perplexing thematic character (whether intended or merely discernable)
of the would-be sequel: To what extent must that result have “a new
and different character”197 than Salinger’s novel if the point of that
commentary is to explore stasis? The district court found that Colting’s sequel “contains no reasonably discernable rejoinder or specific
criticism of any character or theme of Catcher,” but this may be understandable if one considers that the theme hasn’t changed: its context has. The district court still has a chance, on remand, to decide
such questions.
Where there is a transformative use that creates something fresh
out of the old parts of the original (rather than commenting on that
original), courts should consider turning to the broad precepts of
198
Feist for guidance on distinguishing a transformative use from a
merely derivative one. In Feist, a telephone utility sued a publisher
that used the utility’s listings in its own version of a telephone directory. The Court denied relief, finding that the names, addresses, and
phone numbers were uncopyrightable facts that the utility had not
selected or arranged in a sufficiently original manner to be eligible for
a copyright. While the Court based its decision not on fair use, but
rather on the idea/expression dichotomy — a doctrine that says ideas
are not copyrightable, only their individualized expressions are — its
emphasis on, and definition of, originality is instructive. The reason
facts are not copyrightable, the Court explained, is that “the sine qua
non of copyright is originality. . . . Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”199
In a sense, the creator of a transformative work is, ipso facto, vying not merely to distinguish her work from a derivative one, but to
establish her own work as copyrightable. A judicial determination is
required, in such a contest, in order to first distinguish the new work
from the prior work. Feist’s “modicum of originality” is therefore an
appropriate benchmark in the context of adjudging a transformative
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use; just as originality is the sine qua non of copyright protection, so
too should it be the basis of transformative uses.
Within the framework of Feist, then, the derivative right still
serves to protect original works, but the scope of that protection narrows to what is essentially a corollary to the reproduction right. A
secondary work that merely reproduces the original in a new format
(such as a film based on a book) is derivative and no more; certainly, a
change of format is not a transformative act. Similarly, under the
transformation/derivative analysis, the original author’s essential creations — characters, situations, and, importantly, themes (i.e., the building blocks of art) — are analogous to the “facts” of Feist. They are not
independently copyrightable by the subsequent author because, absent “new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings,”200 they are in no way original.
B.

Making Transformation Work

Once courts are equipped to systematically recognize transformative uses, the question becomes not whether they are to be allowed,
but how?
Both Tehranian’s intermediate liability proposal and Leval’s action for profit allocation point to the same conclusion: that a legitimately transformative use has undeniably benefited from the existence of an original, copyrighted work, and that some form of restitution should be made. But profit allocation and intermediate liability
may be difficult remedies to implement — the former because it can be
so difficult to separate the profits resulting from the secondary creator’s efforts (as opposed to those that stem from the merits of the
original), and the latter because it requires a similar determination, in
addition to adding to the process the bureaucratic step of preemptive
registration of transformative uses.
If we consider a transformative use to be akin to a cover version
of a recorded song, however, an alternative solution might be the implementation of a compulsory statutory license fee of the kind already
employed for music recordings.201 As that copyright provision states,
“the privilege of making a [use] of the work . . . shall not be subject to
protection as a derivative work under this title.”202 And as with music,
the Copyright Royalty Judges, whose mission includes “maximiz[ing]
203
the availability of creative works to the public,” could set the appro200
201
202
203
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priate rate. By subjecting transformative uses to a compulsory license
— or, in the event it is not paid, a judicial damage award — secondary
authors would be freed to transform prior works without owner authorization, yet they would pay a nominal sum for the privilege.
Owners would be compensated both through their own efforts and
those of the compulsory license.
C.

A Transformation Doctrine Can Restore Balance to the Copyright-First Amendment Tension

Twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court cautioned, “[I]t should
not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the
204
engine of free expression.” Many commentators believe that rather
than serve to propel free expression, modern copyright law has done
205
more to apply the brakes. Fair use and idea/expression dichotomy
are no match, they say, for large content companies armed with derivative rights; those ameliorating doctrines, once held up to forestall
First Amendment inquiries into copyright’s potential to chill speech,
are no longer robust enough to serve as the bulwark of free expression.
In the end, whether a transformative use is silenced by copyright
owners directly or through the high barriers and legal uncertainties
erected by the copyright statutes, the resulting harm to the culture is
the same: “transformative expression has been muted.”206 Because of
this, judges should balance a legitimate governmental interest — the
interest represented by the Constitutional creation of intellectual
property rights — against the impact of that regulatory regime on the
speech interests also protected by the Constitution.207
An even more fundamental reason that courts should look liberally at transformative uses of copyrighted content is what Jed Rubenfeld calls “the freedom of imagination.”208 The First Amendment exists not merely to protect speech and art that we deem valuable, he
says. It exists to protect all citizens’ rights to exercise the freedoms of
imagination and expression, as long as the exercise of those freedoms
does not conflict with the rights — property rights or otherwise — of
other citizens. Foreclosing this “freedom of imagination” is unconstitutional, Rubenfeld argues, and therefore the justifications for doing
so should satisfy strict judicial scrutiny.
204
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In the case of outright piracy, where a secondary purveyor seeks
merely to free-ride on the copyrighted work of another, infringement
actions and preliminary injunctions are appropriate. Acts of transformation, however, bring something new and original to the table;
they may not be subjectively or even objectively “good,” but just as
the Constitution protects foolish or offensive speech, so too must it
protect futile or unsophisticated art. “The key to a constitutional
copyright law lies in reclaiming and narrowing the core concept of
reproduction [and] revitalizing the distinction between derivative
209
works and reproduction.”
The Wind Done Gone, however, may have marked a turning
point. For the first time, an appellate court explicitly used the First
Amendment to limit the enforcement of an author’s copyright.210 And
in Golan v. Gonzales,211 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that § 514 of the copyright statutes, enacted to grant protection
to certain works that had already been in the public domain in order
to bring the United States into compliance with the Berne Conven212
tion, must be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny. Where Salinger fits on this continuum may yet be seen. The decision has the potential to be an important one in the evolution of a transformation
doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The rights conferred by copyright have continually expanded,
from the duration of the monopoly to the degree of its protections.
Even 170 years ago, in the British Parliament, copyright was seen as a
necessary evil, and term extensions were regarded with suspicion:
“For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil
ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.”213 As copyright’s dominion has expanded, it has
increasingly come into conflict with the Constitution’s overarching
philosophy about its role in cultivating scientific and artistic development. Copyright should promote artistic and scientific progress,214 and
not, as Justice Stevens reminded, serve as an exclusive club for the
215
Today the derivative and reproduction
benefit of rights holders.
209

Id. at 53.
Netanel, supra note 66, at 2.
211 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
212 Id. at 1182.
213 WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 125 (2009) (quoting
Lord Thomas Macaulay in the 1841 British House of Commons debates on term extension).
214 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
215 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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rights represent a dramatic enlargement of copyright protection
216
beyond its modest beginnings.
Fair use requires judges to line-draw between true creative labor
and mere coattail-riding. And as difficult as it may be for judges to
apply the doctrine, writers and artists who seek to rely on fair use
have the most to lose. Copyright law too often fails to distinguish between a pirating use and a productive one: The first is outright theft,
the second, progress.
As an engine of enlightened thought and expression, copyright
law seems dangerously close to outgrowing its original purpose.
Where a copyright no longer serves to spark the spread of knowledge
and inspire the search for truth, but rather to protect moneyed interests, a fundamental right of expression is being denied, and the level
of judicial scrutiny should rise accordingly. The First Amendment
exists to protect all citizens’ rights to exercise the freedom to imagine
and create, and fair use remains the best vehicle for balancing incentives for authors against the expression of subsequent authors.
But it needs to be strengthened. This can be accomplished by resisting the reflex of injunctions in the cases where outright piracy is
not implicated, and by allowing the First Amendment to play a part in
infringement determinations. Courts should also tighten the grip on
the derivative right, which should not be read to foreclose works that
involve creative adaptation rather than literal copying. Most elusive,
though perhaps most helpful, would be to cement the judicial understanding of the transformative use through its own separate, vigorous
doctrine.
All great societies and cultures were built on those that came before: “The Romans copied the Greeks; Shakespeare copied the works
of others with wild abandon and without attribution.”217 William
Fisher made the same point more than twenty years ago, long before
the ability to transform pre-existing artistic works had been spread to
the masses thanks to the Internet and digital technologies:
Active interaction with one’s cultural environment is good for
the soul. A person living the good life would be a creator, not
just a consumer, of works of the intellect. . . . [Walt] Whitman’s
contention that, to realize the promise of democracy, to create
and sustain a society in which people flourish, we must cultivate a
new kind of ‘character’ — one not only more ‘attentive,’ more capable of appreciating the texture of the surface of life, but also
216 See PATRY, supra note 213, at 114 (“Blackstone took a very liberal view toward the
ability of others to appropriate from the author’s work without permission or compensation.”).
217 See PATRY, supra note 213, at 72.
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more energetic, more actively engaged in the production and
transformation of ‘Culture’—is even more applicable to the United States of the 1980’s than it was to the United States of the
218
1860’s.
“What does that have to do with the fair use doctrine?” Fisher
asked. “It suggests that uses of copyrighted material that either constitute or facilitate creative engagement with intellectual products
should be preferred to uses that neither constitute nor foster such engagement.”219 Fisher argued that a society that wishes to nurture the
self-expression and self-realization of its citizens requires:
a rich artistic tradition [and] the richer it is in the raw materials
of representation, metaphor, and allusion — the more opportunities for creativity and subtlety in communication and thought it
affords the members of the culture. The complexity and resonance of the culture’s language in large part depends . . . upon the
quality of its “vocabulary of art.” . . . [Government’s job is to]
protect the culture’s language as a whole and its artistic vocabulary in particular “from structural debasement or decay” — both
by preserving and making accessible to the public “a rich stock of
illustrative and comparative collections” of art and by fostering a
tradition of artistic innovation.220
This is particularly true in an age in which pastiche, remix, and
mash-up represent a new democraticization of art — as well as its future.221 While the origins of copyright law date to a time when modern
notions of authorship were emerging and contributing to the idea of
property rights in creative works, the postmodern sensibility has
created a far different cultural landscape, one in which sampling, remix culture, and other forms of cultural pastiche are becoming the
ascendant forms of expression, particularly among the young.222 Appropriation art — works that take pre-existing culture as their basis — is
devalued by copyright law’s presumption that it is derivative. Worse,
this stance may become untenable as digital technologies make the
assimilation and reproduction of art increasingly accessible. Put more
218 See Fisher, supra note 61, at 1768 (citing WALT WHITMAN, Democratic Vistas, in WALT
WHITMAN: COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE 929-94 (Library of America ed. 1982)
(1st ed. 1867-68)).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1752-53 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Panel Discussion: Arts as a Public Good, 9
COLUM. VLA-J.L. & ARTS 143, 154-55 (1985)).
221 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN
THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
222 Peter Jaszi, Is there Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 105, 111-13 (2009).
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simply, “imagination trumps ownership on the playground, and this
223
This is
freedom should continue even on digital playgrounds.”
where the artists of tomorrow are at play, and the playground is more
boisterous than ever before.

223

See Tushnet, supra note 65, at 505.

